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Skirmishes between constitutional courts and supreme courts 
have occurred not only in established democracies, but also in 
nascent democracies and semi-authoritarian regimes. Yet this 
situation has not received enough scholarly attention, despite the 
widespread conflicts among domestic apex courts.  Most literature 
simply focuses on a single country without systematically and 
comprehensively spelling out the contributing factors.  Employing the 
analytical framework of the game of chicken, this paper aims to fill 
this academic lacuna by suggesting that: 1) information asymmetry 
between apex courts is the key cause of inter-courts conflicts, and 2) 
constitutional courts, isolated from the judiciary, require an alliance 
with other actors to win a war of courts. The conflicts between the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in Taiwan vividly 
demonstrate these points.  Based on the thesis, this Article argues that 
an inter-court conflict may reshape the power equilibrium between 
domestic apex courts, between the judiciary and the elected branches, 
and may be beneficial to society in some circumstances.  
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of World War II, constitutional courts have 
mushroomed around the globe,1 and judicial review has been widely 
regarded as a panacea to counter the tyranny of the majority that leads 
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1 For arguments that justify the establishment of a constitutional court, see Victor Ferreres 
Comella, The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 265, 266-71 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).  
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to gross human rights violations. 2  This worldwide expansion of 
judicial power has been accelerated by the third wave of 
democratization as most nascent democracies founded during this 
period have established constitutional courts to tackle politically 
controversial issues.3 Scholars maintain that democracy has gradually 
become “juristocracy”4 or “a government of judges”5 in which judges, 
instead of demos, rule.  In this light, the judiciary is no longer the 
least dangerous branch.6  It becomes an institution that politicians 
need to reckon with given that it has garnered the power of judicial 
review and other ancillary powers of political salience.7  Although the 
judiciary possesses neither the sword nor the purse, it has deeply 
intervened in the political process such that the judicialization of 
politics has been commonplace all over the world.8   
Yet the judiciary is not necessarily a monolithic institution in 
which there is only one apex court that monopolizes all judicial 
powers.9  Contrarily, and particularly in civil law countries,10 there 
are usually multiple apex courts, including supreme courts, supreme 
                                                 
2 Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND POLITICS 81, 82-87 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008); C. Neal Tate & 
Torbjörn Vallinder, Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Policy, in THE GLOBAL 
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 515, 515 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds. 1995).  
3 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY passim (1991). 
4 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 222-23 (2004).  
5 See Michael H. Davis, A Government By Judges: An Historical Review, 35 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 559, 562 (1987).  
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
7 See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 337-
41 (2014); Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Judicial Review: Ancillary Powers of Constitutional 
Courts, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 225, 230-39 (Tom 
Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2005); Tom Ginsburg & Zachary Elkins, Ancillary 
Powers of Constitutional Courts, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1454-57 (2008) (exploring the 
worldwide spread of ancillary powers).  
8 See, e.g., THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder et al., eds. 
2005); THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA (Björn Dressel ed., 2012).   
9 See Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44, 
50-63 (2007) (discussing inter-courts conflicts in Germany, Italy, Poland, and France); 
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political 
and Judicial Audiences, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 543-45 (2011) (arguing that 
constitutional judges face the dilemma between policy and dispositional preferences when 
facing ordinary high courts). 
10 See Francisco Ramos Romeu, The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study of 
128 Democratic Constitutions, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 103, 118 (2006) (confirming that 
“countries within the 
Anglo-Saxon legal heritage were 80% less likely to set up constitutional courts”). 
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administrative courts, and constitutional courts.  In fact, skirmishes 
between constitutional courts and other high courts have occurred not 
only in established democracies, such as France, Germany,11 Italy,12 
and Belgium, but also in young democracies and semi-authoritarian 
regimes, including Colombia, 13  the Czech Republic, 14  Poland, 15  
Hungary,16 Spain,17 Romania,18 South Korea,19 Taiwan,20 Thailand,21 
and Russia.22  It is therefore plausible to assume that “[s]ystems that 
divide legal authority between a constitutional court and a supreme 
court face coordination problems when allocating jurisdiction and 
                                                 
11 See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 
118-19 (2000) (discussing the case of Lüth).  
12 Carlo Guarnieri, Courts Enforcing Political Accountability, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS 
163, 165-66 (Diana Kapiszewski et al eds., 2013); John Henry Merryman & Vincenzo 
Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 
665, 670-81 (1966-67) (articulating a series of cases that resulted in inter-courts frictions).  
13 See Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, The Judicialization of Politics in Colombia, in THE 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 67, 89 (Rachel Sieder et al., eds., 2005). 
14 See Zdeněk Kühn, Making Constitutionalism Horizontal: Three Different Central 
European Strategies, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 217, 222-25 (András Sajó & Renáta Uitz eds., 2005); RADOSLAV 
PROCHÁZKA, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED ON FOUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN 
CENTRAL EUROPE 159-65 (2002).  
15 Garlicki, supra note 9, at 57-61; PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 108-13.  
16 See Gabor Halmai, The Hungarian Approach to Constitutional Review, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
189, 204-07 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002); PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 136-39 (in 
general, the author argues, the Hungarian Constitutional Court is “less inclined to engage 
in confrontation with ordinary adjudication” than other apex courts in Central and Eastern 
Europe).  
17 See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 174, 183-88 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 
2009); Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human 
Rights Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495, 497 
(2007); STONE SWEET, supra note 11, at 120-21; Leslie Turano, Spain: Quis Custodiet 
Ipsos Custodes?: The struggle for jurisdiction between the Tribunal Constitutional and the 
Tribunal Supremo, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 151, 160-62 (2006).  
18 See Renate Weber, The Romanian Constitutional Court: In Search of Its Own Identity, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
283, 298-303 (Wojciech Sadurski ed. 2002).  
19 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 239-42 (2003) (articulating the relationship between Korean Constitutional 
Court and Korean Supreme Court). 
20 Id. at 134-40. 
21 See Bjorn Dressel, Thailand: Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary, 
in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 79, 82 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012). 
22 See William Burnham & Alexei Trochev, Russia's War between the Courts, 55 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 381, 408-46 (2007) (detailing the intensified conflicts between the constitutional 
court and ordinary courts); ALEXEI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA 214-20 (2008).  
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resolving inconsistencies in rulings.”23  In other words, “the presence 
of tensions among the highest courts is systemic in nature.”24 
Despite the widespread conflicts among domestic apex courts, 
however, this situation has not received enough scholarly attention.  
Most literature simply focuses on a single country without 
systematically and comprehensively spelling out the contributing 
factors.  In fact, nuanced differences exist between systems of judicial 
review in civil law countries, and these institutional variances affect 
the frequency and degree of judicial conflicts, along with other 
contextual factors. This paper aims to fill this academic lacuna by 
suggesting that: 1) information asymmetry between apex courts is the 
major cause of inter-courts conflicts, and 2) constitutional courts, 
isolated from the judiciary, require an alliance with other actors to 
win the war of courts.  
Specifically, Section I surveys why disagreements between 
apex courts occur after the proliferation of constitutional courts, 
suggesting that institutional design and ideational differences are the 
two major reasons that lead to disagreements.  However, not all 
disagreements escalate to open conflicts; such intensification thus 
calls for further explanation.  Adopting a basic analytical framework 
based on the notion of “a game of chicken,” Section II indicates that 
most inter-courts confrontations take place when both courts choose 
not to yield because of information asymmetry.  Once a war of courts 
emerges, which court prevails (in the sense that its legal interpretation 
persists after conflict) is determined not by which court has better 
legal interpretation but by which court has stronger alliances. Hence, 
Section III further investigates the alignment between courts and 
other political actors in these confrontations that may result in the 
shift of power equilibrium among all three branches.  Section IV 
examines the inter-courts conflicts in Taiwan, endeavoring to 
demonstrate that information asymmetry does lead to wars of courts.  
Section V proposes several normative implications, followed by the 
Conclusion.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 49, 59 (2002) (pointing out that judges of ordinary courts 
were “trained, selected, and promoted under the [authoritarian] regime”). 
24 Garlicki, supra note 9, at 63. 
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I. Origins of Judicial Disagreements 
 
With the establishment of constitutional courts around the 
globe in recent decades, inter-courts conflicts have emerged 
accordingly so much so that “[c]onstitutional court judges lament that 
their judgments are not enforced because of resistance and sabotage 
from the rest of the judiciary.  But ordinary judges complain that 
constitutional courts routinely usurp the function of judicial review 
of legislation and intrude in the traditional domain of the regular 
judiciary.”25  Some may argue this is nothing more than a storm in a 
teacup. Nevertheless, the skirmishes between apex courts are so 
intense that they have infringed upon human rights and spawned 
political gridlock.  This presents a puzzle: why do judicial 
disagreements occur so often if there is a “right answer”26 in most 
cases as noted by Dworkin?  Two factors—institutional design and 
ideational divergence—may account for the disagreements between 
apex courts, particularly between a constitutional court and a supreme 
court.  
 
A. Institutional Design 
 
Institutional design of the judiciary affects not only whether, 
but also how, inter-courts conflicts occur.  Three aspects of judicial 
institutions are particularly crucial: the composition of constitutional 
courts, their accessibility, and the scope of jurisdiction.   
First, the personnel composition of constitutional courts may 
suggest the relationship between apex courts. Specifically, three 
major appointment models—representation, cooperation, and single-
body appointment—lead to three types of personnel composition of 
constitutional courts.  In the representation model, all three 
constitutional branches appoint justices to the bench.  That is to say, 
one-third of constitutional judges are appointed by supreme courts 
and can be seen as their allies or agents in constitutional courts.  
Hence, inter-courts skirmishes are less likely to materialize, since 
heterogeneous interests and viewpoints from different courts will be 
fully discussed and negotiations can be made before a decision is 
rendered.  As a corollary, constitutional decisions tend to be more 
moderate and a collegial relationship between high courts is more 
                                                 
25 TROCHEV, supra note 22, at 266. 
26 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985). 
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likely to be forged.27  Countries that have adopted this model include 
Italy, 28 South Korea,29 and Indonesia.30  The cooperation model refers 
to the appointment system whereby the executive nominates all 
constitutional judges who are then confirmed by the legislature.  Both 
the Czech Republic31 and Taiwan reflect this model. Without direct 
participation in the decision-making process, it is difficult for 
supreme courts to defend their interests and positions during the 
process of constitutional decision-making.  Mutual trust between 
apex courts can thus be fragile, and inter-courts tension is more likely 
to emerge.  Finally, in the single-body appointment model, 
constitutional judges are usually appointed exclusively by the 
legislature without the intervention of other branches.  The 
paradigmatic example is Germany.  Theoretically, judges nominated 
this way are likely to share viewpoints akin to those of their 
appointers.  It will not be surprising that constitutional courts may 
deviate from, if not run directly counter to, supreme courts in 
constitutional controversies. 
Institutionally, the representation model is most likely to 
internalize inter-court disagreements by directly including career 
judges in constitutional courts.  By contrast, both the cooperation and 
single-body appointment models lack the formal inclusion of 
supreme courts in the appointment process, a design that results in 
limited mutual understanding between apex courts, which is crucial 
in avoiding head-on confrontations.  Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that politicians often consult or voluntarily nominate judges from 
                                                 
27 See CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 121-24 (2003); CASS SUNSTEIN, 
GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 8-12 (2009). 
28 Tania Groppi, The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a Multilevel System of 
Constitutional Review? in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 125, 127 
(Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).  
29 GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 220. 
30 Hendrianto, Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court, in NEW 
COURTS IN ASIA 158, 161 (Andrew Harding & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010) 
(arguing that the “representation model” model was selected partly because then President 
Megawati tried to consolidate her support by sharing the appointment power with other 
political parties). 
31 See Jiří Přibáň, Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: The Culture of 
Constitutionalism and Human Rights in the Czech Legal System, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTICE EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 373, 377-78 (Wojciech 
Sadurski ed. 2002) (arguing that the Czech framers adopted the American model in this 
regard).  
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ordinary courts to the bench for their professional credibility no 
matter which model is formally adopted.  
In addition to personnel composition, inter court clashes are 
more likely to take place when the constitutional court is more 
accessible to the judicial community and the public. The French case 
stands as one good example.  The Constitutional Council is rather 
inaccessible, since only the two supreme courts (the Cour de 
cassation and the Conseil d’État) are allowed to petition the 
Constitutional Council even after the 2008 constitutional reform.32  
Neither citizens nor judges from lower courts are eligible to file 
petitions for constitutional review.33  Because cases are filtered by the 
supreme courts in advance, the Constitutional Council can only 
access cases with the approval of supreme courts.  Accordingly, the 
number of cases is small, the space for disagreement is procedurally 
circumscribed, and fierce confrontations are relatively few and far 
between.  Moving along the spectrum of accessibility, constitutional 
courts in Italy, Korea, and Taiwan are more accessible than their 
French counterpart. Judges in lower courts may file petitions directly 
so long as the law in question poses a constitutional issue.  This 
design opens the channel for judges of lower courts to challenge 
precedents or legal interpretations made by their superiors before 
constitutional judges, a channel that has led to several disagreements 
between apex courts.  Finally, constitutional complaints result in 
inter-courts conflicts most directly and frequently.  For one thing, 
allowing citizens to petition constitutional courts inevitably enhances 
the number of cases and raises the possibilities of inter-court 
disagreement. For another, cases brought by citizens usually 
challenge judicial decisions made by supreme courts.  By hearing 
constitutional complaints, constitutional courts pose a direct 
challenge to supreme courts and essentially position themselves as 
“super supreme courts” and “judges of the judge.”34  Citizen access 
also accounts for why concrete review is more likely to result in inter-
courts rivalry than abstract review. In abstract review, apex courts 
quarrel about the law, not the decision itself.  Hence, it is the 
legislature, not supreme courts, that is directly subject to 
                                                 
32 For a detailed introduction to the Conseil Constitutionnel, see SOPHIE BOYRON, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE 150-59 (2013).   
33 See Arthur Dyevre, Filtered Constitutional Review and the Reconfiguration of Inter-
Judicial Relations, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 743-44 (2013). 
34 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from 
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1684 (2004).  
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constitutional scrutiny.  On the other hand, concrete review allows 
constitutional courts to scrutinize judicial decisions.  Supreme courts 
therefore encounter face-to-face inquiry since it is their own decisions 
that are under review and possibly being overruled. 
Last but not least, constitutional courts contradict with 
supreme courts over the scope of jurisdiction.  This is arguably the 
most pivotal factor that affects inter-courts clashes.  In theory, each 
court has the final say in its own jurisdiction and there should be no 
conflict.35  This distinction works in some countries, such as Austria, 
where “[t]he relationship between the three Supreme Austrian Courts 
raises no particular problems, since the Federal Constitution precisely 
determines the different functions of each court.”36  In other countries, 
however, the demarcation between constitutional review and legal 
interpretation is opaque for at least two reasons.  First, constitutional 
courts often determine the constitutionality of law by dictating legal 
interpretation.  Namely, a law is constitutional only if it is interpreted 
in a certain way. 37  This approach clearly blurs the line between 
constitutional review and legal interpretation.38  Second, in human 
rights cases, the third-party effect of constitutional clauses creates “an 
objective value system” in which ordinary judges must construe and 
apply statutes in harmony with constitutions. 39   This provides 
constitutional courts with more opportunities to intrude in the domain 
of legal interpretation to make sure that constitutional harmony is 
maintained.  
A related point is the timing of judicial intervention. All 
things being equal, ex ante judicial review creates the least amount of 
conflicts between apex courts.  Adopted by France40 and Romania,41 
                                                 
35 TROCHEV, supra note 22, at 268. 
36 Anna Gamper & Francesco Palermo, The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern 
Profiles of an Archetype of Constitutional Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 31, 47 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).  
37 See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
52-53 (2014). 
38 MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
378-79 (2014).   
39 Frank I. Michelman, The Interplay of Constitutional and Ordinary Jurisdiction, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278, 289 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 
2011). 
40 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative 
Institutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
21, 32 (Wojciech Sadurski ed. 2002).  
41 Weber, supra note 18, at 286-87.   
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ex ante judicial review bites before the promulgation of a law, much 
earlier than any concrete case could take place.  Hence, it is unlikely 
to result in inter-courts conflicts since the disagreement, if any, exists 
between the constitutional court and the legislature.  In contrast to the 
French model, ex post judicial review occurs after a law takes effect 
and is usually activated in concrete cases.  Naturally, this type of 
review stimulates more inter-judicial tension when apex courts 
diverge on legal interpretation.  
In sum, inter-courts friction is inherent in the bifurcation of 
the duty of ordinary courts to apply the law and the monopoly of 
constitutional courts to interpret the constitution.  Since all laws must 
be consistent with constitutional mandates, in practice whoever has 
the power of constitutional interpretation has the final word over all 
legal disputes.  Insomuch as there is a disagreement between 
constitutional courts and supreme courts in terms of legal 
interpretation, the exercise of constitutional review is often 
condemned by judges of supreme courts as a usurpation of judicial 
review.42  
 
B. Ideational difference 
 
Although institutional design is important in explaining the 
origin of inter-courts disagreements, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for conflicts to take place.  Rather, it is merely one 
condition under which disagreements may materialize.  Another 
pivotal factor is judicial actors themselves.  Scholars have pointed out 
that “the preoccupation of respective judges with their professional 
stature and their concern to uphold or reinforce the status of the court 
of which they are a member” contribute to the escalation of inter-
judiciary tension.43  Both constitutional and supreme courts would 
like to expand their own power at the expense of the other.  This 
tendency of self-aggrandizement results mainly from the ideational 
differences between judges of different apex courts even though they 
are all called “judges.”  Specifically, three ideational elements—
professional background, judicial audience, and the raison d'être of 
constitutional courts—motivate courts to stand up for the fight. 
First, judges in constitutional courts and supreme courts 
usually have distinctive professional backgrounds and perceptions of 
                                                 
42 See Kühn, supra note 14, at 222-35. 
43 VISSER supra note 38, at 377.  
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themselves.  The former tends to be political, active, and 
individualistic, whereas the latter perceive themselves to be passive, 
collective, and apolitical appliers of the law.  In general, 
constitutional judges tend to be prominent scholars or lawyers who 
have close ties with politicians before they serve on the bench.  When 
interpreting constitutions, they usually need to create new laws 
substantively to flesh out the constitutional norms.  By contrast, 
ordinary judges in civil law countries are expected to be faceless 
bureaucrats operating in a narrow, technical, and even ossified way.44  
They decide cases by mechanically applying the laws enacted by the 
legislature.  To them, professionalism is equivalent to being apolitical.  
This ideology is reinforced and reproduced by state examinations, 
vocational training, and hierarchical control by judges of higher 
echelons. 45   After entering the system, most ordinary judges are 
socialized to be conservative and passive, while those who resist such 
socialization are marginalized, if not disciplined.46  The Chilean case 
is a good example in which hierarchal control and apoliticism 
contribute to the reluctance of the Chilean Supreme Court to be 
proactive in the protection of human rights even after 
democratization. 47   This divergence of professional backgrounds 
inevitably creates tension between apex courts.  
Second, the audiences with which the two apex courts seek to 
engage are somewhat different.  This attitudinal distinction has been 
identified in the past two decades: constitutional courts seem to have 
a global mindset, whereas supreme courts mostly focus on the 
domestic legal community.48 Empirical studies show that, among civil 
law countries, career judges tend to cite fewer foreign decisions and 
                                                 
44 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE 34-38 (2007). 
45 See Neil Chisholm, The Diffusion of American Judicial Independence Ideology into 
Taiwan and South Korea, 5 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 204, 206 (2013) (arguing that this 
is one way to secure judicial independence). 
46 LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS 
FROM CHILE 173-74 (2007). 
47 See Javier Couso & Lisa Hilbink, From Quietism to Incipient Activism: The Institutional 
and Ideological Roots of Rights Adjudication in Chile, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 99, 
101-05 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011); HILBINK, supra note 46, at 
224-28 (arguing that hierarchal control and apoliticism discouraged judges from defending 
human rights and rule of law).  
48 See VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 71-102 
(2013); Cheryl Saunders, Judicial Engagement with Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 571, 571-75 (Tom Ginsburg & Tosalind Dixon eds., 2011).  
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international conventions than their constitutional counterparts. 49   
This finding is consistent with the educational and professional 
backgrounds of different courts.50  Career judges receive training that 
leads them to deduce “from a written, legislated text as the source of 
the general law,” and thus reasoning is “formal, legalistic and 
magisterial in tone.”51  Judicial dialogue is neither emphasized nor 
encouraged by conventional legal training.  By contrast, “these 
features of civilian judicial reasoning are less pronounced in 
constitutional adjudication.” 52  Constitutional judges are asked to 
illuminate the vagueness of constitutional texts; hence, innovation 
and flexibility are both necessary virtues in constitutional review.  
Also it is not uncommon that they were academics or lawyers before 
being promoted, who are more likely to be open-minded, actively 
engaging comparable international and foreign experiences in 
reasoning, and less constrained by domestic judicial precedents. 
This attitudinal divergence may intensify inter-courts tensions 
in two ways.  Firstly, the audience the court tries to engage with 
reflects “[the] court’s position and how it views its role with respect 
to sociopolitical struggles over the polity’s collective identity.”53  For 
example, in Korea, “[w]hile the Supreme Court appears to follow its 
notoriously conservative Japanese counterpart, the Constitutional 
Court appears to model itself on its activist counterparts in Germany 
and the United States.” 54   Secondly, domestic judges are not 
necessarily bound by foreign case law.  It follows that constitutional 
decisions predicating legal reasoning on foreign case law might be 
called into question by other courts as ungrounded.  For example, the 
Taiwanese Constitutional Court faced just such a controversy in 
Interpretation No. 582 in which it referenced a number of 
                                                 
49 See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Judges as Discursive Agent, in THE USE OF 
FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 373, 382-83 (Tania Groppi & Marie-
Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013); Akiko Ejima, A Gap between the Apparent and Hidden 
Attitudes of the Supreme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents, in THE USE OF 
FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 273, 382-83 (Tania Groppi & Marie-
Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) (pointing out that “the Supreme Court of Japan is not 
interested in foreign case law”). 
50 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 44, at 35.  
51 Saunders, supra note 48, at 578. 
52 Id.  
53 RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (2014).  
54 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 241-42 (arguing that in Korea, judges of ordinary 
courts, trained domestically, have different vision than their counterparts in constitutional 
courts). 
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international treaties, including the ECHR and ICCPR.55  Citing these 
international covenants, the Constitutional Court struck down two 
precedents issued by the Taiwanese Supreme Court, resulting in the 
most intense contention between the two courts. 56   Ironically, 
constitutional courts cite international and foreign laws in order to 
justify their decisions and facilitate dialogue, yet ordinary courts are 
not able to digest the message and in turn challenge the legitimacy 
and validity of the decisions.  Judicial engagement invites contention 
rather than pacifying it. 
Finally, the establishment of constitutional courts itself is a 
byproduct of political struggle and compromise.  In countries such as 
Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand,57 constitutional courts are founded to 
meet politicians’ needs, be they buying political insurance or 
lowering the cost of democratic transition.  That is to say, from the 
very beginning, the birth of constitutional courts and the staffing of 
justices have strong political overtones in addition to protecting 
human rights and restoring rule of law.  Moreover, the trend of 
judicialization of politics in the past two decades has significantly 
expanded the power of constitutional courts.58  It not only shifts the 
equilibrium between the political and judicial branches but also 
occurs at the expense of supreme courts. To illustrate, many powers 
of political salience, such as the powers to dissolve political parties, 
to impeach the presidents, and to oversee elections are granted to 
constitutional courts instead of supreme courts. 59 In fact, supreme 
courts used to monopolize the power of judicial review, yet now the 
power is shared by, if not completely transferred to, constitutional 
courts. 60   The power redistribution between the Korean Supreme 
Court and the Korean Constitutional Court before and after 
democratization is the best example.61  In short, the political nature of 
                                                 
55 J.Y. Interpretation No. 582 (2004), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=582. 
56 Id. 
57 See Bjorn Dressel, Thailand: Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary, 
in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 79, 82 (2014); Andrew Harding & Peter 
Leyland, The Constitutional Courts of Thailand and Indonesia, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 317, 319-23 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 
2009). 
58 C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power? in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 28-30 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds. 1995).  
59 See CHANG ET AL., supra note 7, at 337-41; Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 230-39.  
60 See Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 7, at 1434. 
61 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 208-17. 
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a constitutional court has strong implications for confrontation with 
the supreme courts.   
As a result, the establishment of constitutional courts has been 
opposed by supreme courts very early on in some countries,62 since 
the raison d'être of creating a new constitutional tribunal reflects 
precisely the distrust towards the original judiciary headed by a 
supreme court.63  Most constitutional courts are established after the 
authoritarian period during which supreme courts are deferential to 
the political branches and impotent in maintaining rule of law.  What 
is worse, they sometimes serve as the paws and claws of strongmen 
legitimizing totalitarian reign. This subservient image seriously 
damages the reputation of supreme courts as an independent and 
capable institution to eradicate gross human rights violations, check 
and balance political branches, and protect fundamental rights.  
Consequently, most constitutional courts enjoy higher reputations 
than supreme courts during the post-transition period.  From this 
perspective, the hostilities between constitutional courts and supreme 
courts are inherent in many dual systems that have both apex courts.  
Constitutional judges see their counterparts in supreme courts as 
conservative and outdated while supreme courts find constitutional 
courts overly assertive and intrusive.64 
 
C. Summary 
 
Admittedly, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”65  In the civil law context, 
nonetheless, this truism does not tell who exactly has the final say 
over what the law is in the judicial department.  From the previous 
discussion, both the institutional design of constitutional courts and 
                                                 
62 See Andrew Hardin, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, 1998-2006, in NEW COURTS 
IN ASIA 121, 127 (Andrew Hardin & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010).  
63 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 32; Andrew Hardin et al., Constitutional 
Courts: Forms Functions, and Practice in Comparative Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 11-15 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009); 
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE 23 (2000).  For a somewhat different explanation of the emergence of 
constitutional adjudication in CEE, see Kasia Lach & Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional 
Courts of Central and Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 52, 59-61 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009); Michelman, supra note 
39, at 281.  
64 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 21 (2005). 
65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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the ideational perception of constitutional judges vary greatly from 
that of supreme courts and ordinary judges.  Institutionally, 
constitutional courts have carved out distinctive jurisdiction and 
become accessible and powerful at the expense of supreme courts in 
the last three decades.  Ideationally, constitutional judges are 
appointed by political branches if not popularly elected and 
undoubtedly have different and even antithetical views about the 
law.66  These structural and ideological divergences have resulted in 
tensions between apex courts.  
However, not all disagreements between apex courts escalate 
into a war of courts.  Any open inter-courts conflict is so costly to 
both apex courts that they will choose to negotiate and compromise 
in most scenarios. The question of when disagreements will escalate 
into head-on conflicts presents itself as a new puzzle that needs to be 
solved. 
 
I. When do Open Conflicts Occur 
 
Although disagreements between apex courts are not 
uncommon, a war of courts does not seem to be an everyday 
phenomenon.  Judges on both sides are rational actors who calculate 
the costs and benefits before taking any actions and are unlikely to 
initiate open conflicts actively since confrontation between apex 
courts is costly.67  This being the case, either constitutional courts or 
supreme courts tend to compromise in most scenarios where there is 
a judicial disagreement.  Given this, it is worth exploring why both 
apex courts sometimes, but not always, insist on confronting with 
each other at the expense of their own institutional reputations and 
social order.  Consideration of the game of chicken and of cost-
benefit analysis suggests that information asymmetry between apex 
courts may be crucial.68  
 
                                                 
66 In Bolivia, for instance, judges of constitutional courts are popularly elected after 2009.  
67 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25-63 (2013); RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK 57-77 (2008); but see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 52-59 (2006) (arguing that Posner’s 
pragmatism focuses too much “on the viewpoint of judges rather than on the overall design 
of the interpretive system”).  
68 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
991, 1004-05, 1024-30 (2008) (using similar approaches to explain inter-branch conflicts). 
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A. The Game of Chicken 
 
Through the lens of game theory, constitutional courts and 
supreme courts are actually playing the game of chicken when 
competing for supremacy.69  Suppose a petitioner challenges a legal 
interpretation issued by a supreme court in front of a constitutional 
court.  When the constitutional court agrees with the petitioner on the 
merits, both courts have two options: the constitutional court may 
choose to uphold the decision of the supreme court based on other 
reasons (i.e., C.C. swerves) or quash it (C.C. does not swerve).  
Similarly, the supreme court may choose to accept the constitutional 
interpretation (S.C. swerves) or resist it (S.C. does not swerve).   
 
Table 1: The Game of Chicken between Apex Courts70 
Payoff of 
(CC, SC) 
S.C. swerves S.C. does 
not swerve 
C.C. 
swerves 
(1) 
(status quo) 
(0, 0) 
(2) 
(loss of 
public support, 
institutional 
prestige et. al) 
(-25, 50)  
C.C. does 
not swerve 
(3) 
(institutional 
prestige et. al, loss of 
jurisdiction) 
(50, -25) 
(4) 
(loss of 
public support & 
judicial chaos for 
both courts) 
(-50, -50) 
 
Although each court has two options, they do not choose 
strategies randomly but do so partly in response to the other’s strategy.  
To begin with, the constitutional court would not “swerve” when it 
believes the supreme court will choose to succumb (Cell (3)) because 
the constitutional court wins two major benefits in this circumstance: 
institutional prestige and public approval.  When the constitutional 
court strikes down supreme court decisions, its status as the guardian 
of the constitution is further entrenched.  This is particularly 
                                                 
69 For an introduction of the game of chicken, see, for example, ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES 
AND INFORMATION 70-71 (2007).   
70 This figure is adapted from MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI PUBLIC CHOICE 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009). 
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important in new democracies where the constitutional court needs to 
establish its authority.  Moreover, public approval is another good 
which constitutional judges long for.71  For one thing, constitutional 
judges are often political appointees whose recognition hinges in part 
on public support, which is particularly crucial in accumulating 
political capital.  The more popular a court, the more effectively it 
may implement its decisions, check coordinate branches, and most 
importantly, expand its power.  In sum, given the potential benefits 
the constitutional court may garner if it wins a battle of courts, it has 
strong incentives to stand firm when it knows the supreme court 
would swerve.  
Conversely, the constitutional court is likely to compromise 
when the supreme court insists on and is determined to defend its 
legal interpretation (Cell (2)).  Supreme courts do have strong 
incentives to defend their legal interpretations in order to sustain legal 
stability and strengthen their authority in the domains of civil and 
criminal law.  Even though the doctrine of stare decisis is not 
formally recognized in civil law countries, precedents made by 
supreme courts are equivalent to de facto law.  In other words, 
supreme courts maintain their supremacy in the realm of civil and 
criminal law by wielding the power to issue precedents and thus have 
strong incentives to push back when legal interpretations are 
challenged by constitutional courts.  Also, change of widely accepted 
precedents affects current practice by lower courts since numerous 
cases on trial have to adjust.  This adds the burden to supreme courts, 
and increases their willingness to resist constitutional courts.  In 
circumstances where such determination is firm and observable, 
constitutional courts are likely to give in since the two major benefits 
mentioned above—institutional prestige and public approval—are 
uncertain if supreme courts refuse to collaborate.  
Cells (2) and (3) are Nash equilibria in the game of chicken 
between apex courts: one court goes straight and the other swerves to 
prevent the worst scenario (Cell (4)).  The analysis implies that inter-
courts conflicts might be completely avoided if each court were to 
have perfect information of the other’s strategy.  If constitutional 
courts know in advance that supreme courts will definitely reject their 
interpretations, they are unlikely to be overly assertive and will soften 
their positions, since resistance from supreme courts certainly raise 
                                                 
71 Id. at 59.  
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the cost of constitutional decisions.  Likewise, if supreme courts 
know beforehand that their decisions will not survive the gauntlet of 
constitutional review, they may take this into account and revise their 
opinions accordingly.  This explanation is also consistent with the 
inference discussed in representation model—since constitutional 
courts include representatives from supreme courts, the two courts 
are more likely to share mutual understandings and less likely to cross 
lines. 
In the real world, however, the information is almost always 
asymmetric.  Both courts may miscalculate the potential costs to them 
and shy away from confrontation.  In Cell (1), both courts choose to 
compromise rather than fight.  Constitutional courts may 
conditionally uphold a decision even though they find it 
constitutionally dubious and supreme courts have little reason to 
revolt since their decision is maintained.  In this scenario, neither the 
constitutional court nor the supreme court receives any benefit. 
On the other hand, mutual miscalculation could lead to more 
disastrous situations when both courts wrongly assume that the other 
will swerve.  Cell (4) refers to the scenario in which constitutional 
courts quash supreme courts’ decisions and the latter decides to resist 
publicly.  This is the worst scenario because both apex courts gain no 
benefit and bear costs, at least in the short term.  For the constitutional 
court, the costs include the non-compliance of supreme courts and, 
more importantly, the loss of public approval.  Compliance with 
decisions is always a serious concern of the judiciary due to its lack 
of the sword and the purse.  Lacking mechanisms for sanctioning and 
monitoring, constitutional courts face greater challenge to ensuring 
adherence than do supreme courts, which may exercise hierarchical 
control over lower courts.  Ordinary judges who disagree with 
constitutional courts can easily abuse their discretion to delay 
implementation, or even blatantly ignore them.  Even the U.S. 
Supreme Court has to rely on other branches for implementation;72 to 
say nothing of other constitutional courts that face both external 
political obstacles and internal judicial barriers.  When decisions are 
repeatedly disobeyed, the authority of constitutional courts wanes. 
The disobedience of the political branches further discourages lower 
courts from conforming, and a vicious cycle that is detrimental to 
compliance with constitutional decisions thus emerges.  From this 
                                                 
72 GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 88-91 (2008) (articulating the resistance of 
state courts in the American context during the civil rights movement). 
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perspective, non-compliance affects, and at the same time reflects, 
the authority of constitutional courts.  
Inter-court conflicts not only damage the authority of both 
constitutional and supreme courts but also result in the ebb of public 
approval for several reasons.  First, inter-courts frictions usually 
render the judiciary chaotic and lead to rights infringement.  This is 
particularly evident in the domain of criminal law because human 
rights violations are particularly gross in this field during 
authoritarian periods and these violations are legitimized by supreme 
courts that are submissive to dictators.  It is therefore understandable 
why constitutional courts would target criminal law, and why 
resistance from supreme courts is rampant in this regard. As both 
sides have interests at stake, disagreement (or the following 
confrontation) is likely to aggravate rights violations.  Second, inter-
courts conflicts reveal the fact that there is no single correct answer 
to every legal question, and judges are essentially legislating rather 
than adjudicating under these circumstances.  It follows that, more 
fundamentally, judges can be as political as politicians that prioritize 
personal ideologies, interests, and preferences.  This can be 
detrimental to both courts, since judicial authority and supremacy is 
built upon the façade of judicial neutrality and disinterestedness.73  
That is, inter-court frictions manifest the fact that judges can 
sometimes be politicians in robes.  In a word, inter-courts 
confrontation serves no good to either party.  Given that both courts 
are presumed to be rational, it is plausible to argue that such open 
conflict only takes place when both courts underestimate the other’s 
determination to defend its own stance.  
Some may argue that inter-courts conflicts are not necessarily 
the worst scenario that both courts would try to avoid.  Both sides 
might still attack each other even if they know the other party would 
not yield, and thus lack of mutual understanding is not the key link 
between disagreement and open conflict.  For example, a 
“constitutional showdown” may provide long-term benefits by 
setting precedents and reducing decision and transaction costs in the 
future.74  That is, the cost-benefit analysis mentioned above is too 
narrow and considers only institutional benefits but not social welfare 
                                                 
73 See JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS 
7-10 (2009) (explaining the idea of positivity bias).  
74 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1010-11(discussing-branch conflicts). 
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as a whole.  It is reasonable to assume that the long-term interests will 
outweigh the short-term costs led by such conflicts.  
Furthermore, it could also be argued that the above game-of-
chicken analysis does not take into account judges’ personal stakes, 
which may incentivize them to disregard institutional interests.  That 
is, a constitutional court is a “they,” not an “it” and faces collective 
action problems.75  As a corollary, “even if some particular approach 
to constitutional judging is best for all judges, it does not follow that 
it would be best for any given judge.”76  For example, constitutional 
judges in most civil law countries do not enjoy life tenure,77 which is 
guaranteed only to career judges in ordinary courts.  In other words, 
constitutional judges need to find a job after stepping down.78  The 
argument goes that constitutional court judges are likely to pursue 
personal reputations or dispositional preferences 79  rather than 
institutional interests and are willing to wage a war even if this leads 
to the worst-case scenario that harms the institution.80  By contrast, 
with life tenure, judges of supreme courts may value collegial 
friendship more and be less assertive than their counterparts in 
constitutional courts.81  
These critiques are reasonable, but it is unclear to what extent, 
if any, judges of apex courts prioritize, or at least consider, social 
welfare before making any decisions.82  Also, unlike politicians who 
are accountable to the electorate, “[b]ecause judges gain nothing for 
themselves by advancing good policy as they perceive it, their 
incentives to pursue this goal are not overwhelming.”83  To be sure, 
the long-term benefits of inter-courts conflicts may outweigh its 
short-term costs from the perspective of the whole society—an issue 
that will be covered later.  What this paper suggests here, however, is 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 246-48 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, The 
Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 554-63 (2005). 
76 ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 134 (2011).  
77 Austria and Belgium are two notable exceptions. 
78 See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY 24 (2000) (arguing that 
“career choices after one’s service is completed introduces a measure of self-interest”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
79 Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 544. 
80 Of course, given that many constitutional courts require a supermajority of vote to issue 
decisions, whether, or how often, this strategy will succeed is another intriguing issue.  
81 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 42-43 (2013) (arguing that 
judges try to avoid the ill will of one’s colleagues by refraining from dissenting). 
82 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1025.  
83 LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 50 (2006).  
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not whether inter-courts conflicts should be encouraged normatively, 
but when inter-courts conflicts will emerge in practice. Moreover, 
compared to inter-branch constitutional showdowns, the scale and 
impact of inter-court frictions are usually more moderate.  It follows 
that the long-term benefits caused by such conflicts are more 
uncertain.   
As to the self-interest problem, it has been ameliorated or at 
least lessened, through institutional design.  For one, some 
constitutional courts adopt a consensual approach during the process 
of decision-making and prohibit personal opinions, preserving the 
prestige and undergirding the authority of their decisions. 84   For 
another, constitutional courts usually require a majority of votes to 
deliver any decisions.  The threshold may effectively render the 
stance of the moderate (usually the median or swing justice) more 
likely to prevail.85  Therefore, the drive of personal interests may not 
change the fundamental logic of the game of chicken between the two 
courts.  
 
B. Factors that Facilitate Prediction 
 
Given that inter-court conflicts result from miscalculation, it 
is necessary to understand how a court predicts the other’s strategy as 
to prevent head-on clashes under normal circumstances.  Several 
factors may help both courts better estimate the strategy of their 
counterpart: the composition of constitutional courts, legal stability, 
the type of disagreements, and social ties.  
First, the composition of constitutional courts is the most 
effective way constitutional judges may predict the reaction of their 
counterparts in supreme courts.  As mentioned earlier, there are three 
main appointment systems of constitutional courts.  In the 
representation model, one-third of constitutional judges are appointed 
by supreme courts without the intervention of other branches.  These 
former supreme court judges serve as reference points that allows 
other constitutional judges to be able to predict the stance of supreme 
courts.  Of course, a supreme court is also a “they” not an “it,” and 
the opinions of some of its former members certainly do not represent 
                                                 
84 See VOLCANSEK, supra note 78, at 26-27.  
85 See THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 95-138 (2005). 
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the court as a whole.  But they do at least provide some information.  
Note this does not imply constitutional courts that adopt different 
appointment models are unable to predict the behavior of their 
counterparts.  No matter which model is formally adopted, there are 
usually some seats substantively reserved for career judges, and the 
appointers will consult supreme courts before nominating. The more 
diversified the composition of a constitutional court, the more easily 
it may predict the action of different actors.   
Second, the potential impact of a decision on legal stability is 
also an indicator which constitutional courts may use to predict how 
supreme courts might react.  As mentioned earlier, legal stability is 
particularly important to supreme courts, which have the final say 
over all civil, criminal, and administrative controversies.  Any attack 
against precedent not only destabilizes legal order but also challenges 
the authority of supreme courts in these domains.  Nonetheless, not 
all precedents are treated alike.  Inter-court frictions are more likely 
to emerge when a precedent declared unconstitutional and void has 
remained valid for a longer period of time.  From a normative 
perspective, supreme courts would reasonably expect that a well-
established precedent should be more constitutionally sustainable.  
From a pragmatic angle, change of a widely accepted precedent 
increases the burden on supreme courts since it affects numerous 
cases currently on trial in ordinary courts.  Therefore, constitutional 
courts should be more cautious when they quash a precedent that has 
long been in effect.  
Moreover, the type of disagreement also influences how 
supreme courts will react.  Theoretically, supreme courts will react 
more strongly when it is their decisions, rather than statutes, that are 
overruled.  This explains why concrete review is more provocative 
than abstract review in the eyes of supreme courts.  In abstract review, 
technically it is the statute that is questioned, not the judicial decision 
itself, even though there are disagreements about how the law should 
be interpreted.  In other words, it is the legislature, instead of supreme 
courts, that is directly at war with constitutional courts.  By contrast, 
in concrete review, constitutional courts directly challenge, and 
actually diminish, the authority of supreme courts when striking 
down their decisions.  Unsurprisingly, this will lead to head-on 
collisions more easily.   
Last but not least, judges of both courts, however 
professionally trained, are still part of society and will inevitably be 
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susceptible to the social climate.86  This common background may 
render them more able to know what the other would rule under 
certain circumstances.  In a conservative society, for instance, it 
would be inconceivable for constitutional courts to strike down 
judicial precedents that prohibit gay marriage.  The judiciary, albeit 
not popularly elected, is majoritarian more often than not. 
 
C. Summary 
 
Section I identifies a plethora of elements that may result in 
judicial disagreement, but these factors cannot explain why inter-
court conflicts occur in some countries but not in others that share 
similar institutional and ideational characteristics.  They also fail to 
elucidate when skirmishes will emerge.  To further clarify these 
conundrums, this section applies a basic model of the game of 
chicken, suggesting that open confrontations take place when both 
apex courts wrongly believe the other would succumb and choose to 
go charge ahead.  Once an inter-court conflict emerges, the next 
question becomes what strategies courts will choose.  Anecdotal 
evidence has shown that constitutional courts have often prevailed in 
a war of courts.  Given that they are established outside the judiciary, 
constitutional courts may forge coalitions with other political actors 
when asserting jurisdiction.87  This is usually followed by escalated 
tension between apex courts. 
 
II. Alliances with other Actors 
 
Although inter-court conflicts do not happen frequently, they 
usually become the focal point in the political arena since a war 
between high courts can hardly be a pure judicial issue.  Such 
contentions very often result from the materialization of frictions and 
the re-alignment of major political agents.  In a forward-looking 
fashion, the redistribution of judicial power has impact on different 
government organs, political parties, and other potential actors. This 
is because change in the judiciary reshapes the framework in which 
power struggles take place, particularly in an era of global 
                                                 
86 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 293 (2014).  
87 See John Ferejohn, Judicial Power: Getting it and Keeping it, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURT 
349, 360 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013). 
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judicialization of politics where most political conflicts are 
eventually solved in courtrooms.88  Hence, it is crucial to investigate 
the alignment among courts, other political institutions, and key 
stakeholders in order to understand the new political dynamics that 
have emerged from inter-court conflicts.   
Moreover, once a clash takes place, which court will prevail 
does not usually depend on whose legal interpretation is better but 
rather on who can successfully forge an alliance with other actors.  
Therefore, constitutional courts and supreme courts are respectively 
incentivized to ally with different political actors such as citizens, 
lower courts, and politicians.  From the perspective of the 
constitutional court, both institutional disadvantage and legitimacy 
crises strongly motivate it to ally with all three actors.  Structurally, 
constitutional courts are dependent on other institutions to initiate 
constitutional review and implement their decisions since 
constitutional courts lack control of both the lower courts as well as 
the political branches.89 Also, since constitutional courts are created 
outside the conventional judicial system, their legitimacy is built 
more on recognition from their audience, particularly the general 
public. Compared to supreme courts, therefore, constitutional courts 
are more likely to rule in line with mainstream doctrines and ally 
themselves with citizens (or public opinion leaders in some cases).  
In a word, constitutional courts may ally with politicians, lower courts, 
or citizens, depending on the context.  As for supreme courts, the 
alliance is often with politicians.  In Poland, for example, the new 
Constitution of 1997 provides more textual munitions for the Polish 
Supreme Court to defy the Constitutional Court.90  On a conceptual 
level, supreme courts are unlikely to ally with the public in a war of 
courts since there would be no case to start with if a supreme court 
agrees with citizens. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 99-112 (2008) (introducing several illustrative cases of 
judicialization of politics); Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. 
Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191, 191-211 (2002).  
89 But see SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 8-9 (pointing out that constitutional courts can act 
sua sponte in Albania, Hungary, Montenegro, Poland before 1997, Russia before 1994, and 
Serbia).  
90 PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 110-11. 
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A. Alliance with Citizens 
 
The phenomenon of alliances between constitutional courts 
and citizens is widely observed when the former clashes with 
supreme courts.  Specifically, three major channels facilitate such 
alignment.  
First, in some Eastern European states, citizens may “initiate 
abstract review regardless of whether they have specific legal 
interests in the case in question”91 through an institution called actio 
popularis.92  In Hungary, where even non-citizens can lodge such suit, 
this approach has been widely used to invalidate the death penalty 
and protect free speech.93  Since citizens may directly challenge the 
constitutionality of a law without a concrete controversy, the conflict 
between apex courts is least likely to happen through this channel.  
Second, citizens may petition constitutional courts when their 
constitutional rights are infringed after exhausting all available 
judicial remedies.  In countries like Taiwan and Poland, it is statutes, 
rather than judicial decisions, that are subject to constitutional review.  
This is usually categorized as abstract review, a compromised version 
of constitutional complaint situated between the first and third types.  
Although judicial decisions are not directly challenged in this 
scenario, inter-court confrontations sometimes take place when apex 
courts disagree with how statutes should be interpreted.  Finally, the 
last category comprises a form of constitutional complaint in which 
constitutional courts may scrutinize the decisions of ordinary courts, 
an institution adopted in countries like the Czech Republic, Germany, 
and Russia.  Since it is the constitutionality of judicial decisions that 
is questioned and overruled, the conflicts between apex courts are 
most acute.  Essentially, constitutional courts function as special 
“appellate courts” for supreme courts, or in the words of many 
ordinary judges, “super supreme courts.”  Despite some institutional 
variances, the three channels share one crucial characteristic: it is the 
citizens that challenge the constitutionality of a law or the legal 
interpretation of supreme courts before constitutional courts.  As a 
corollary, when constitutional courts rule in favor of petitioners, the 
                                                 
91 SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 6.  
92 SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 35. This institution has been repealed, however.  
93 Id. at 81-82.   
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triad is broken down into two against one,94 and the alliance between 
constitutional courts and citizens is thus forged.  
Admittedly, some may argue that only in the German-style 
constitutional complaint can we find judicial decisions being the 
target of constitutional scrutiny. 95  In other jurisdictions, it is the 
constitutionality of statutes that is challenged.  Hence, the alliance 
between constitutional courts and citizens emerges only in the third 
category.  This claim is technically correct but analytically 
misleading.  Inter-court clashes are possible in all three categories 
when constitutional courts rule in favor of citizens, even when 
constitutional courts do not review concrete decisions.  By striking 
down the statue from which supreme courts derive legal 
interpretation, constitutional courts practically compel supreme 
courts to change their original ruling.  The interaction between the 
Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation in 1965 shall 
demonstrate this point.  The Italian Court of Cassation rendered a 
decision on procedural issues related to “summary investigation” in 
1958, ruling that some fair-trial guarantees are not fully required in 
this type of proceeding.  In February 1965, the Constitutional Court 
was asked to review the constitutionality of provisions concerning 
this issue, and required the Court of Cassation to revise its 1958 
jurisprudence.96  The Court of Cassation refused to do so; in response, 
the Constitutional Court simply struck down the contested provision, 
forcing the Court of Cassation to alter its original interpretation.  
Simply put, striking down statutes in abstract review is 
sometimes functionally equivalent to striking down decisions in the 
context of inter-courts conflicts.  In both circumstances, 
constitutional courts disregard the authority of supreme courts in 
legal interpretation and adjudication.  This analysis is also consistent 
with empirical findings, since a plethora of harsh inter-court conflicts 
have taken place in countries without concrete review.   
In addition, constitutional courts can further consolidate the 
alliance by ruling in favor of (the majority of) citizens.  In fact, 
judicial accessibility usually triggers a self-empowering circle: the 
more accessible a constitutional court is, the more opportunities it has 
to rule in favor of the public; the more popular it is, the more 
                                                 
94 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 2 (1981). 
95 See Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 102, 112-13 (Andrew Hardin & Peter 
Leyland eds., 2009). 
96 Merryman & Vigoriti, supra note 12, at 670-75. Garlicki, supra note 9, at 55 
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authoritative it becomes in rendering its mandates.97  This is because 
“[t]aking a majoritarian approach . . . ensures the greatest likelihood 
of compliance.”98  When the decisions are generally obeyed, more 
people will go to constitutional courts for help, and the process 
repeats itself, so on and so forth.  Scholars have pointed out that 
“[t]here is a clear correlation between the existence of an activist, 
powerful constitutional court and the availability to citizens of a 
direct constitutional complaint procedure.”99  This may explain in part 
why most constitutional courts in civil law countries are the most 
trustworthy branch among the three.  It is plausible to assume that 
whoever stands by the public will win a war of courts.  
For example, in a high profile case involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in the Czech Republic, “the Supreme Court judges refused 
to accept the ruling . . . of the Constitutional Court and virtually put 
the system of justice into a deadlock.”100  Well exposed and criticized 
by the press, the Supreme Court seemed to have lost popular support, 
and “the case may be perceived as a symbolic breaking point in the 
‘war of the courts’ badly damaging both the public and expert 
reputation of the Supreme Court.”  This extra-legal pressure made the 
Supreme Court eventually yield to the Constitutional Court, and 
“consequently led to the acceptance of the constitutional principle of 
a generally binding character of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
in the human rights jurisdiction.”101  This example vividly presents 
the new political dynamics emerging from the constitutional court-
citizen alignment that shapes the power relation between the two high 
courts.  It may also explain why the constitutional court is deemed as 
the most trustworthy of the three branches in many post-authoritarian 
countries.102  
To be sure, insofar as citizens are composed of individuals 
with heterogeneous interests, preferences, and ideologies, both apex 
courts may claim public approval to some extent.  Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
97 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 73-74 (calling this configuration the high equilibrium of 
judicial review). 
98 See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Courts in Democratization, in CONSEQUENTIAL 
COURTS 45, 47 (Diana Kapiszewski et al., eds. 2013). 
99 SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 8. 
100 Juri Priban, Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: the Culture of 
Constitutionalism and Human Rights in Czech Legal System, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE 
EAST AND WEST 373, 381 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002). 
101 Id. at 381. 
102 SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 237; Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 13, at 99-100. 
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degree of support for different courts not only differs but also matters 
in the context of inter-court conflicts.  Usually only the court with 
higher popular support may successfully forge an alliance with the 
public that helps it prevail in a war of courts.  In many new 
democracies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, constitutional courts 
are more popular than supreme courts partly because of the 
performance and images of the supreme courts during the 
authoritarian periods.  It may not be surprising that the constitutional 
courts in both countries have won critical battles against the supreme 
courts.  In a nutshell, since public approval is pivotal to the 
implementation of judicial decisions, ceteris paribus, the court with 
higher public support is more likely to forge an alliance with the 
people and thus prevail in an inter-court conflict.  
Finally, legal experts, serving as both opinion leaders and 
mobilizers, are crucial in forging the alliance between courts and 
citizens and facilitating the empowering cycle.  On the one hand, in 
countries like France, the Czech Republic, and Taiwan, the discourse 
of legal experts actually suggests the outcomes of inter-court 
conflicts: whoever wins support from scholars has the upper hand in 
the debate.  This may result from the authority that scholars in civil 
law countries enjoy in legal interpretation: legal scholars’ opinions 
are highly respected by judges, politicians, and other legal 
pratictioners.103  Consequently, the court that is supported by scholars 
tends to be more legitimate and authoritative, prevailing the inter-
court struggle.  By contrast, battles stretch out into a prolonged war 
when the opinion of scholars is divided.  On the other hand, legal 
scholars and activist lawyers also play a leading role in public-interest 
litigation,104 organizing petitioners, and designing strategies to bring 
cases to constitutional courts.  In this sense, lawyers not only 
strengthen the linkage between citizens and constitutional courts, but 
also consolidate the power of constitutional courts.105 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 44, at 60. 
104 Terence C. Halliday et al., Introduction: The Legal Complex in Struggling for Political 
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1, 2 (Halliday, Karpik & Feeley eds., 
2007). 
105 See Terence C. Halliday, Why the Legal Complex is Integral to Theories of 
Consequential Court, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURT 337, 343-44 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. 
eds., 2013); see also CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 11-25 (1998).  
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B. Alliance with Lower Courts 
 
Lower courts have been on both sides of the divide: alignment 
between constitutional courts and lower courts is commonly observed, 
while alignment between supreme courts and lower courts is also 
present with strong institutional justification.  As the frontline 
adjudicator that takes up the most cases, lower courts manifest an 
attitude that seems to signal the power dynamics within the judiciary 
when they choose to conform to the will or preferences of one high 
court rather than the other.  
Judges from lower courts have ample reason to stand by 
supreme courts when apex courts clash, as supreme courts are 
institutionally advantaged to influence lower courts through the 
precedent106 and personnel policy.  First, lower court judges are bound 
by precedents made by their superiors in practice even though the 
doctrine of stare decisis is not formally binding in civil law systems.  
Judgments inconsistent with precedents are most likely to be reversed 
or dismissed.  This leads to the second channel through which 
supreme courts exert clout over lower courts: personnel policy.  
Lower court judges are evaluated for several aspects, one of which is 
their reversal rate.  Since conforming to precedent substantially 
reduces the possibility of being reversed, lower court judges are 
incentivized to follow their superiors.  Second, as career judges, 
lower court judges are under the hierarchical control of a system of 
discipline and promotion.  That is to say, judges in supreme courts 
also oversee the sanction and promotion of judges in lower courts.  
All the formal constraints give supreme courts an institutional 
advantage to push lower courts for support.  In addition, informal 
pressure resulting from seniority and “face-saving” is also a common 
reason for junior judges to conform to senior judges in supreme courts, 
since they share the same social and professional backgrounds.  
Simply put, supreme courts have disproportionate influence upon 
lower courts both formally and informally. 
                                                 
106 Unlike precedent in a common law sense, this form of precedent is abstract legal 
reasoning articulating and regulating application of formal laws, especially when a legal 
element needs clarification in trial practice.  The purpose of precedents is to unify different 
legal opinions among different divisions in the Supreme Court in order to provide unified 
standard application for lower court judges.  See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra 
note 44, at 36, 46-47 (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is formally rejected, but 
precedents are still influential in practice). 
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On the other hand, lower court judges can also form a strong 
alliance with constitutional courts for different reasons.  First, from 
the perspective of institutional design, there has been a trend that 
endows lower court judges the power to file direct petitions to 
constitutional courts without the screening of supreme courts.107  This 
new mechanism opens up a channel for lower court judges to seek 
assistance from constitutional courts when they need to fight for 
internal judicial independence.  Second, ideational affinity may also 
account for why lower court judges are willing to ally with 
constitutional courts in inter-court conflicts, a state of affairs that 
seems to be fairly prominent in many post-transition jurisdictions.  
Specifically, supreme court judges in the third-wave democracies 
usually enter the judicial hierarchy during the authoritarian era and 
are promoted to move up the ladder because of their compliance and 
deference.  Conversely, judges in lower courts are usually fresh 
graduates who have just left law schools and the training institute.  
Though they have been taught to follow conventional doctrine and to 
respect seniority, the fact that they have more exposure to the thinking 
of liberal democracy and that they are not yet fully socialized into the 
hierarchy differentiates them from senior judges.  In this regard, they 
may be ideologically closer to constitutional judges, who are usually 
academics and attorneys with foreign education background before 
being appointed, and are generally more liberal than their 
counterparts in supreme courts.  It is thus plausible that constitutional 
courts and lower court judges share a perception of the role of law in 
a democratic society, as opposed to the judges of supreme courts who 
emphasize the legalistic view of law and hierarchical authority.  
In fact, many precedents overruled by constitutional courts 
are the result of petitions by lower court judges when they find the 
precedents constitutionally problematic.  Also, lower courts judges 
may challenge the rulings of supreme courts on behalf of citizens that 
have not exhausted all available remedies in some countries.  When 
they do so, an alignment between lower courts and constitutional 
courts is thus forged, indicating a redistribution of power within the 
judiciary.   
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Dyevre, supra note 33, at 743.  This power is plainly stipulated in some states, such as 
Italy, and granted by constitutional courts in others, such as Taiwan. 
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C. Alliance with Politicians 
 
The notion of an alliance between courts and politicians 
seems counterintuitive at first glance, as conventional wisdom has 
long held that the judiciary exists to check and balance the political 
powers.108  Nonetheless the relationship between the judiciary and 
political branches is in reality actually more symbiotic.  On the one 
hand, it is in the interests of politicians to invite the judiciary to 
“interpose its friendly hand”109 when they need to legitimize policy 
choices, overcome political gridlock, and shift blame.110  On the other 
hand, courts need political support to implement decisions effectively.  
However persuasive their reasoning, judicial decisions are unlikely to 
penetrate to the ground without the support of political power. 111  
Namely, both sides have strong incentives to forge an alliance.  
In cases surveyed, politicians often side with constitutional 
courts, rather than supreme courts, in the context of inter-court 
conflicts.  This phenomenon can be analyzed both politically and 
institutionally.  First, in a transitional context, the creation of 
constitutional courts itself is reflective of politicians’ distrust toward 
supreme courts in many countries.  As mentioned above, judges of 
ordinary courts are usually labeled the vestiges of old regimes, 
whereas constitutional courts are regarded as guardians of 
constitutions in new democracies.  This political reality may render 
politicians in power more willing to support constitutional courts 
rather than supreme courts whenever conflicts occur.  Second, in 
addition to human rights protections, constitutional courts are 
established precisely because they can be of great help for 
politicians. 112   This may also explain why politicians, be they 
presidents or congressional minorities, usually have special standing 
                                                 
108 See Ferejohn, supra note 87, at 349-52. 
109 See Keith E. Whittington, Interpose Your Friendly Hand: Political Supports for the 
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
583, 586-93 (2005). 
110 GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS 7-13 (2003); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 105-60 (2007); Stefan Voigt & Eli M. 
Salzberger, Choosing not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, 55 
KYKLOS 289, 293-98 (2002). 
111 See ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 94-106 (using the developments of civil rights 
movement in the post-1964 United States as an example). 
112 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 22-33 (proposing an insurance theory); RAN HIRSCHL, 
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 38-49 (2004) (advancing an explanation centered on hegemonic 
preservation).  
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to petition constitutional courts directly in many countries.  Third, the 
appointment procedure of constitutional courts already suggests 
personal relationships, shared ideology, or interests in common 
between judges and politicians.  By contrast, supreme court judges 
are promoted based on their seniority.  This suggests that 
constitutional courts have closer affinity with politicians in power.  
The Conseil Constitutionel in France, for example, “is dominated by 
political allies of the appointing authorities.”113 So are the German114 
and Italian Constitutional Courts. 115   Not to mention that former 
presidents of the French Republic are members of the Conseil for life.  
Hence, the alliance between constitutional courts and politicians 
should not be surprising.  It also explains why many Kelsenian 
constitutional courts have been politicized to a considerable extent.116 
Compared with the former two types of alliances, the alliance 
with politicians implies more drastic change in power relations.  From 
the view of constitutional courts, politicians are strong allies that 
ensure decision compliance, offer protection from political retaliation, 
and lessen the resistance and intervention from ordinary courts.  
Again, the alignment between the French Conseil Constitutionel and 
the legislature is one good example.  After the 2008 constitutional 
reform, lower courts may seek advice from the Conseil Constitutionel 
whenever they encounter constitutional questions through either the 
Cour de cassation (equivalent to a supreme court) or the Conseil 
d’État (supreme administrative court).  The Cour de cassation was 
once reluctant to send referrals to the Conseil, endeavoring to 
downplay its influence and intervention.  This irritated not only 
constitutional law scholars but also legislators, who made it more 
difficult for judges of the Cour de cassation to filter referrals. 117  
Another good example is Colombia.  The Colombian Constitutional 
Court has frequently issued tutela 118 to protect fundamental rights 
against state actions, including rulings of the Colombian Supreme 
                                                 
113 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 34, at 33; Nuno Garoupa, The Politicization of the 
Kelsenian Constitutional Courts, in EMPIRICALLY STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 149, 168 
(Kuo-Chang Huang ed., 2008). 
114 See Garoupa, supra note 113, at 163. 
115 See VOLCANSEK, supra note 78, at 23; id. at 172. 
116 See Garoupa, supra note 113, at 162-83 (articulating the politicization of constitutional 
courts in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal).  
117 See Dyevre, supra note 33, at 750-53. 
118 In a word, tutela is a broader version of the writ of habeas corpus. For detailed 
introduction of this institution, see Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The 
Gender Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-
AMERICAN L. REV. 253, 276-77 (1999). 
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Court. 119   This has unsurprisingly infuriated the Supreme Court, 
which has fiercely denounced the institution of tutela and proposed 
to weaken it.  Eventually, the Constitutional Court prevailed in the 
war of courts with the support of the congress by rejecting the 
proposal.120     
 
D. Alliance with Regional Courts 
 
Although constitutional courts are more likely to form 
alliances with other actors and thus prevail in a war of courts due to 
their political ties and sensitivity, this does not mean that supreme 
courts are always fighting alone.  Occasionally, ordinary courts will 
successfully convince politicians to support them.  The existence of 
regional courts, such as the European Court of Justice or Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, further complicates the interaction 
between supreme courts and constitutional courts in these regions.  
Although the decisions of regional courts are not necessarily binding, 
their legal interpretation undoubtedly provides additional 
ammunition for the judicial arsenal.  In fact, the existence of a 
regional court provides domestic courts another chance to extend the 
battle.  Even though domestic constitutional courts have the final say 
over constitutions, their decisions will inevitably be affected by 
international and regional covenants interpreted by international and 
regional courts in the era of globalization. 121   That is, domestic 
ordinary courts may turn the tables with the support of regional courts.  
The conflict between the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and German Federal Labor Court is the best example here.  
Since the late 1950s, the two courts had disagreed on the validity and 
scope of the German Basic Law.122  The German Federal Labor Court 
contended that the Basic Law has direct effect (or horizontal effect), 
at least in the domain of employment law.  By contrast, the 
Constitutional Court tends to interpret the Basic Law narrowly, 
arguing it has only indirect effect.  Normally, the Constitutional Court 
                                                 
119 See Maria Paula Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-à-
vis Neoliberalism? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 533, 541-42 (2007). 
120 See Morgan, supra note 118, at 319-23.  
121 See Nancy Maveety, Comparative Judicial Studies, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS 
294, 301-02 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009). 
122 See Alec Stone Sweet & Kathleen Stranz, Rights Adjudication and Constitutional 
Pluralism in Germany and Europe, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 92, 97-100 (2012). 
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should prevail since it has the exclusive power of constitutional 
review, but the decisions promulgated by the European Court of 
Justice tipped the balance between the Constitutional Court and the 
Labor Court in favor of the latter. 123  The German Constitutional 
Court succumbed and changed its interpretation accordingly.124 
 
E. Summary 
 
Institutionally, constitutional courts should be weaker than 
supreme courts in a war of courts because they have no power to 
discipline lower courts and ensure decision adherence.  Politically, 
however, constitutional courts have closer ties with political elites 
and are more sensitive to public opinion.  Both political ties and 
public opinion are valuable resources in an inter-court conflict.  In 
fact, the institutional disadvantage will instead motivate 
constitutional courts to ally with other actors more actively to 
strengthen their power vis-à-vis supreme courts.  With the 
intervention of exogenous forces, the original power equilibrium 
between apex courts will unavoidably change to some extent after 
inter-court conflicts.  This dynamic has occurred in many 
jurisdictions, such as Taiwan, which will be discussed at length below.  
 
III. Case Analysis: Wars of Courts in Taiwan 
 
Similar to other civil law jurisdictions, multiple apex courts 
in Taiwan enjoy supremacy in their own domains: 125  the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, and a special commission for civil servants.  
Major disputes did also arise between the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court.  
Unlike other constitutional courts established in the third 
wave of democratization, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court was 
founded during the authoritarian period in 1947, while the Nationalist 
                                                 
123 Id. at 99. 
124 Id. at 100. 
125 For a clear illustration of the judicial structure in Taiwan, see Wen-Chen Chang, Courts 
and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: Gradual Transformations Towards the Guardian of 
Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 143, 147 (Jiunn-rong 
Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014); Chang-fa Lo, Taiwan: External Influences Mixed 
with Traditional Elements to Form Its Unique Legal System, in LAW AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND INNOVATIONS 91, 103-07 (E Ann 
Black & Gary F. Bell eds., 2011). 
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government was still in Mainland China.  At that time, it was 
deferential to the strongmen and similarly bore the stigma of being a 
rubberstamp, if not the claws, of dictators.  What renders it more 
peculiar is that the judicial system was originally modeled on the U.S. 
system in that the Judicial Yuan was to function as the final resort for 
all controversies, including constitutional, civil, criminal, and 
administrative issues.  Due to the resistance of ordinary judges at the 
founding era, however, the original idea was never implemented and 
the current system in Taiwan basically reflects the German style.126  
This history has planted the seed for future inter-court conflicts.  
Granted by the constitution, the Constitutional Court has the 
power of abstract judicial review, yet the scope of judicial review is 
not detailed in the constitution.  Whether judicial precedents (Pan-
Li) 127  issued by the Supreme Court can be scrutinized remained 
nebulous for a long time.  During the authoritarian period, the 
Constitutional Court had expanded the scope of judicial review by 
self-aggrandizement, which resulted in tension between the two 
courts.  First, it rendered a series of decisions to establish its authority 
and legitimacy to review precedents from the two supreme courts—
the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal for civil and criminal 
cases, and the Supreme Administrative Court as the final resort of 
administrative cases.  In Interpretation No. 154, the petitioner came 
to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Administrative Court’s 
precedent was unconstitutional because it denied him access to the 
court.128  The Constitutional Court created the power to scrutinize 
precedents but upheld the constitutionality of the precedent to prevent 
possible confrontation or disobedience,129 a “Marbury moment” in 
Taiwan.130  After four years, the Constitutional Court used this power 
again to nullify a precedent made by the Supreme Court in 
Interpretation No. 177.131  In the following years, the Constitutional 
                                                 
126 See Chien-Liang Lee (李建良), Dafaguan de Zhidu Biange yu Sifayuan de Xianfa 
Dingwei (大法官的制度變革與司法院的憲法定位), 27 NTU L.J. 217, 237 (1998).  
127 For a brief introduction of Pan-Li system, see Chang, supra note 125, at 164.  
128 J.Y. Interpretation No. 154 (1978) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=154 [hereinafter 
Interpretation No. 154]. 
129 GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 135-36. 
130 Ferejohn, supra note 87, at 354-57.  
131 J.Y. Interpretation No. 177 (1982) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=177 [hereinafter 
Interpretation No. 177]. 
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Court continued to review the constitutionality of precedents in a 
series of cases. 132  Although disagreements between the two apex 
courts were inevitable, they did not escalate to open conflicts.  
Open conflict between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court did not occur until Interpretations No. 530133 and No. 
582. 134   The controversy in the former decision revolved around 
whether the judicial system should follow the American model 
(where there is one single apex court), favored by the framers, or the 
German model (where there are one Supreme Court and one 
Constitutional Court), which has been in practice for more than five 
decades.  The importance of this reform project cannot be overstated 
since it will fundamentally alter the structure of the judiciary and 
affect the power of the Supreme Court over lower courts and legal 
interpretation if successfully implemented. 135   Although the 
Constitutional Court ruled clearly in favor of the American model, 
the Supreme Court vehemently resisted,136 and the decision has never 
been implemented.  It also seems unlikely to be implemented in the 
near future.  
The latter case, Interpretation No. 582, was arguably the most 
serious clash between the two courts.  The Constitutional Court 
voided two precedents concerning whether or not a co-defendant’s 
statement can be used against the other co-defendant without cross-
examination.137  The two precedents held that the statement of a co-
defendant is equivalent to a confession; thus, it shall be admitted to 
trial automatically.138  By contrast, the Constitutional Court treated a 
co-defendant as an independent witness, and maintained that he or 
she shall be orally examined by the other co-defendant’s counsel at 
trial.139  Hence, the two precedents were quashed as they violated the 
                                                 
132 These decisions include but not limited to J.Y. Interpretations No. 185, 187, 201, 213, 
220, 243, 256, 266, 269, 271, 275, and 306. 
133 J.Y. Interpretation No. 530 (2001) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=530 [hereinafter 
Interpretation No. 530]. 
134 J.Y. Interpretation No. 582 (2004) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=582 [hereinafter 
Intrepetation No. 582]. 
135 See Jau-Yuan Hwang (黃昭元), Sifa Weixian Shencha de Zhidu Xuanze yu Sifa Yuan 
Dingwei (司法違憲審强的制度選擇與司法院定位), 32 NTU L.J. 55, 65-70 (2003); Lee, 
supra note 126, at 239-45.  
136 Chang, supra note 125, at 146.  
137 Supra note 134. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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due process guaranteed in the Constitution.140  Although this case was 
seen as a great stride toward protecting criminal procedural rights, the 
Supreme Court was greatly irritated.  Soon it held a press conference 
and openly expressed strong disagreement by maintaining that 
ordinary courts would continue applying the said precedents.141  The 
Supreme Court further criticized that the Constitutional Court 
distorted the two voided precedents, hampered criminal law practice, 
and encroached upon its jurisdiction.  This momentous clash 
eventuated in a second Constitutional Court decision, Interpretation 
No. 592, 142 which reiterated and clarified the scope and effect of 
Interpretation No. 582.  The Supreme Court was not fully satisfied, 
but did not issue any comments or act further in public.  
The two inter-court confrontations in Taiwan demonstrate 
how disagreement escalated into conflicts because of information 
asymmetry, and that power dynamics shift in a war of courts, as the 
Constitutional Court received support from external allies.  Both 
courts thought the other would swerve, and the mutual 
misunderstanding resulted in the head-on clashes.  
Specifically, from the perspective of the Constitutional Court, 
half of constitutional judges at that time were judges of the Supreme 
Court or the Supreme Administrative Court before being appointed 
when delivering the two Interpretations.  Given their background 
serving as career judges and personal connections with former 
colleagues on both supreme courts, they should have knowledge 
about whether the two Interpretations would trigger resistance, and 
would have acted to soften the position of the Constitutional Court 
when necessary.  Moreover, these constitutional judges could have 
easily vetoed any decision they deemed improper or too provocative, 
since a supermajority of votes is required to pass any constitutional 
decision.  In the case of Interpretation No. 530, such behavior did not 
take place.  Not only did the Constitutional Court issue the decision, 
but moreover none of the former Supreme Court judges issued any 
dissenting opinion. 143  As for the case of Interpretation No. 582, 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 See Pi-Hu Hsu, On the Application of Sec. II Art. V, Constitutional Interpretation 
Procedure Act 222 TAIWAN L. REV. 133, 137 (2013). 
142 J.Y. Interpretation No. 592 (2005) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=592. 
143 The only dissenting opinion came from a justice with a scholarly background, who 
studied in Austria. J.Y. Interpretation No. 530 (2001) (Taiwan), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=530. 
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former judges of other apex courts including one specializing in 
criminal procedure, also agreed with the majority to strike down the 
precedents at issue. 144   Given the controversy surrounding this 
decision, judges from supreme courts should have vetoed it, or at least 
issued dissenting opinions if they found it intolerable.  Nonetheless, 
only one justice from the Supreme Administrative Court issued a 
dissenting opinion.  Since most judges had consented, at least 
ostensibly, the Constitutional Court was not aware of the severe 
resistance from the Supreme Court. 
In addition, two years before Interpretation No. 530, the 
Judicial Yuan held the National Judicial Reform Convention to 
discuss the organizational framework of the judiciary in Taiwan.145  
The American model was widely supported by most participants (99 
out of 121), including legal scholars, lawyers, judges, and 
representatives from NGOs.146  In Interpretation No. 530, it seems 
reasonable for constitutional judges to assume limited resistance from 
the Supreme Court since they simply reconfirmed what had already 
been discussed in the convention.147  A similar situation occurred in 
Interpretation No. 582 as well.148  As discussed earlier, it was not the 
first time the Constitutional Court struck down judicial precedents.  
The Constitutional Court would not have expected to encounter 
unprecedented pushback.  
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
the two constitutional decisions were equally surprising and beyond 
what it could tolerate.  In Interpretation No. 530, the Constitution 
Court tried in vain to fundamentally renovate the judicial system.149  
Given that the current German model has been in practice for about 
six decades and functioned properly, the decision was simply 
incomprehensible in the eyes of the Supreme Court.  Likewise, the 
two precedents that were struck down in Interpretation No. 582 had 
been invoked repeatedly for more than four and six decades 
respectively.150  Given this legal stability, it is conceivable that the 
Supreme Court would not expect these two precedents to be nullified 
                                                 
144 It should be noted that four constitutional judges appointed from ordinary courts 
recused themselves in this decision.  
145 See Hwang, supra note 135. 
146 Id. at 65; but see Tzung-Jen Tsai (蔡宗珍), Woguo Xianfa Shenpan Zhidu zhi Jiantao 
(我國憲法審判制度之檢討), 98 TAIWAN L. REV. 49 (2003).  
147 Supra note 133. 
148 Interpretation No. 582. 
149 Supra note 133. 
150 Interpretation No. 582. 
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and voided.  It turned out that both apex courts misjudged, leading to 
wars of courts. 
In regard to the power dynamics emerging from the two 
serious collisions, the availability of alliances indicates the destiny of 
the two cases.  Interpretation No. 530 has never been implemented, 
while Interpretation No. 582 has been gradually accepted despite the 
resistance of the Supreme Court at the beginning.  A crucial ally was 
present in the latter case, but absent in the former one: legal academia.  
In Interpretation No. 530, although some consensus had been reached 
beforehand in the judicial reform convention, scholarly opinion was 
highly divided. 151   Scholars who studied in the United States 
supported the decision, while scholars who studied in Germany, 
preferring the European model, generally opposed it and stood in 
favor of the status quo. 152   Interpretation No. 582, by contrast, 
received overwhelming if not unanimous support among criminal law 
scholars and NGOs.153  Given this pressure, it would be difficult for 
the Supreme Court to resist for a long time.  
Another key ally, politicians, might have also contributed to 
success or failure in the two cases.  Interpretation No. 530 was an 
institutional reform that required political cooperation and 
coordination.  Therefore, the presence of political allies is especially 
crucial.  Unfortunately, the interpretation did not garner enough 
support from politicians in power because of political gridlock at the 
time.154  The lack of political alignment is a major factor behind the 
impasse.  In contrast, Interpretation No. 582 did not require active 
government involvement.  Consequently, its implementation is more 
feasible so long as the public led by opinion leaders clearly stands by 
the Constitutional Court instead of the Supreme Court. 
 
IV. Normative Implications 
 
Analyses in this paper bring forth normative implications on 
three fronts: public interest, power dynamics, and institutional design.   
First, an inter-court skirmish may advance the public interest 
in the long run for society as a whole, although it may generate no 
                                                 
151 See Hwang, supra note 135. 
152 See Lee, supra note 126, at 243 n.43. 
153 See Judicial Reform Foundation, Announcement on Interpretation No. 582, 
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/index_new2014.asp?id=469 (last revisited April 10, 2016). 
154 See Hwang, supra note 135, at 67 n.26. 
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institutional good for either apex court.  In this sense, such conflict 
shall be encouraged.  Public interest advanced in this context includes 
precedent setting, authority clarification, and human rights protection.  
Specifically, in many Latin American, Eastern European, and Asian 
young democracies (most of which are civil law countries with 
multiple apex courts), governments have enacted amnesty law to 
grant immunity to former high-rank officers in exchange for 
bloodless political transition.  After democratization, nonetheless, 
victims of past human rights violations usually try to repeal the 
relevant law in the pursuit of justice.  Facing this moral predicament, 
supreme courts tend to recognize amnesty law since they are 
generally legalistic and conservative, 155 while constitutional courts 
tend to focus more on human rights protection and substantive justice.  
Inter-court conflicts arising in this context actually serve the public 
interest by clarifying the legal character of transitional justice.  That 
is, a society will be better off in the long run if the thorny issues of 
restorative justice can be solved as clearly (and perhaps early) as 
possible.  Another good example is the debate over the death penalty.  
Capital punishment, whose character is both criminal and 
constitutional, has often resulted in a split between the supreme court 
and the constitutional court in European countries.  Being an 
extremely divisive issue that repeatedly sparks controversy, this is an 
issue that needs to be fully debated and properly tackled.  An inter-
court conflict at an early stage may spur in-depth deliberation and 
help reach a precedent that stabilizes the system in the long-term 
despite its short-term costs.  Note that the benefit of precedent-setting 
may be particularly enduring in the judicial sphere not only because 
the doctrine of stare decisis is in effect prevalent in every judicial 
system, but also because of the nature of constitutional interpretation: 
the constitution is what constitutional judges say it is to paraphrase 
Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court. 156  Admittedly, 
without enough information, a premature conflict may simply 
establish unnecessary or even problematic precedents.157  Whether 
this is the case, however, is case-specific and beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The point here is that an inter-court clash may be positive to 
society, advancing public good in the long run.  
                                                 
155 HILBINK, supra note 46, at 189-202. 
156 Columbia 250, Charles Evans Hughes, 
http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/charles_hughes.html. 
157 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1038-40. 
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Second, in terms of shifting power equilibrium, an inter-court 
conflict may lead to new dynamics between apex courts.  Supreme 
courts seem to have gradually lost their supremacy in the domain of 
civil, criminal, and administrative laws.  By contrast, constitutional 
courts would essentially become the “appellate court” of supreme 
courts if ambitious enough.  To be sure, this depends on how 
constitutional courts exercise their judicial review power against 
supreme courts.  One crucial constraint is the size of the docket, as 
constitutional courts review much fewer petitions and cases than 
supreme courts.  Nevertheless, to be a “super supreme court,” a 
constitutional court need not overrule many decisions issued by a 
supreme court, but rather only the critical ones.  As long as a supreme 
court is overshadowed by the risk of “being reversed,” however small 
the likelihood of this is, the pressure becomes real.  Moreover, 
another type of power dynamic, the “boomerang effect” or “ping-
pong effect,” 158  has emerged between constitutional courts and 
supreme courts.  Petitioners frustrated by supreme courts may bring 
their cases to constitutional courts, and once they win in 
constitutional courts, they usually can go back to supreme courts and 
ask for another review. 
Third, a war of courts may also reshape the power dynamics 
between the judiciary and the political branches, as well as between 
different political parties.  As suggested in the previous analysis, 
support from external actors, particularly the political branches, is 
pivotal in a war of courts.  This collision and alignment actually has 
a reinforcing effect on the relationship between law and politics.  
Issues over which courts fight publicly are usually of paramount 
political salience, since doing so entails great costs for both apex 
courts.  Once the debate takes place at the judicial arena, it attracts 
public attention and puts the issues into the political agenda, thus 
creating incentives for politicians to be involved in the war of courts.  
Political parties with divergent views might align with different 
courts in the hope of increasing popular support.  Various approaches 
are available to popularity-seeking politicians, such as revising 
related statutes or even constitutional provisions, or openly 
supporting or refusing future implementation of the court’s decision.  
                                                 
158 See Kathryn Sikkink, The Transnational Dimension of the Judicialization of Politics in 
Latin America, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 8 at 
263, 267; Kathrin Zippel, Transnational Advocacy Networks and Policy Cycles in the 
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These political moves may result in more political turmoil or expand 
the power of a court at the expense of the other, such as the case in 
France and Poland.  In short, the dynamic interaction between 
politicians and courts demonstrates how inter-court conflict may 
translate into power struggle, not only in the judiciary, but the 
political sphere.   
Finally, from the perspective of constitutional stability, the 
representation model may be the best mechanism to appoint 
constitutional judges since it reduces inter-court conflicts most 
effectively by guaranteeing that constitutional courts include some 
former judges of supreme courts.  Namely, all things being equal, the 
representation model best diversifies the composition of 
constitutional courts both in terms of ideology and personnel.  This 
not only makes their opinions more moderate, but also renders 
constitutional courts better able to predict the reaction of the other 
three branches—a design that may contribute to constitutional 
stability.  Of course, benefits brought by inter-court (or even inter-
branch) conflicts may be prevented as well, such as with the 
aforementioned function of authority clarification.  Future framers 
need to reckon with the issue of how to strike a middle ground that 
spurs interest-enhancing confrontations and discourages those that 
result only in judicial chaos.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Judicial disagreements result from a variety of reasons, but it 
is information asymmetry between apex courts that explains why 
some disagreements escalate to open conflicts but not others.  In 
essence, a head-on collision takes place when both apex courts 
miscalculate the other’s strategy since a confrontation may entail 
great institutional costs to both courts, including the loss of public 
support and judicial power.  Once a war of courts occurs, which court 
prevails does not necessarily depend on whose legal interpretation is 
better but rather hinges on who can successfully forge an alliance 
with other actors, such as lower courts, the academia, or politicians 
in power.  The case of Taiwan, along with Colombia, France, Poland, 
and many other countries, vividly demonstrates this point: whoever 
secured external support won the war of courts.  Despite some short-
term costs, a judicial showdown between apex courts can generate 
public good.  In certain contexts, a public confrontation that spawns 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2016] “GLOCALIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION         335 
 
 
judicial chaos may even lead to greater constitutional stability in the 
long run.  
Furthermore, this paper concentrates on the interaction 
between constitutional courts and supreme courts.  Obviously, there 
are other types of inter-court conflicts, such as the wars between 
administrative courts and constitutional courts, between secular 
courts and religious courts, 159  and between regional courts and 
domestic courts.160  What motivates these conflicts and what these 
conflicts may bring about remain largely unclear.  It is plausible that 
studies on these inter-judiciary conflicts may shed new light on 
current theories of separation of powers, separation of church and 
state, and the domestic, regional, and global judicialization of politics. 
 
                                                 
159 See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts as Bulwarks of Secularism, in 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURT, supra note 12, at 321-27.  
160 See generally, e.g., Stone Sweet & Stranz, supra note 122 (discussing conflicts between 
European Court of Justice and German Federal Constitution Court).  
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